Abstract Procedures designed to select alternatives on the basis of the results of pairwise contests between them have received much attention in literature. The particular case of tournaments has been studied in depth. More recently weak tournaments and valued generalizations thereof have been investigated. The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent these choice procedures may be meaningfully used to define ranking procedures via their repeated use, i.e. when the equivalence classes of the ranking are determined by successive applications of the choice procedure. This is what we call "ranking by choosing".
Introduction
In many different contexts, it is necessary to make a choice between alternatives on the sole basis of the results of several kinds of pairwise contests between these alternatives. Among the many possible examples, let us mention:
-Sports leagues (games usually involve two teams), LAMSADE -Social choice theory, via the use of C1 or C2 Social Choice functions (as defined by Fishburn, 1977) , in view of the well-known results in McGarvey (1953) and Debord (1987b) , -Multiple criteria decision making using "ordinal information" (see Arrow and Raynaud, 1986; Roy, 1991) , in view of the results in Bouyssou (1996) , -Psychology with, e.g., the study of binary choice probabilities (see Luce, 1959; Suppes, Krantz, Luce and Tversky, 1989) .
This problem has received close attention in recent years most particularly when the result of the pairwise contests may be summarized by a tournament (an excellent account of this literature may be found in Laslier, 1997) and much is known on the properties and interrelations of such choice procedures. This line of research has been recently extended to weak tournaments (ties are allowed, see Peris and Subiza, 1999; Schwartz, 1986) and valued generalizations of (weak) tournaments (intensity of preference or number of victories may be taken into account, see Barrett, Pattanaik and Salles, 1990; Basu, Deb and Pattanaik, 1992; Dutta, Panda and Pattanaik, 1986; Dasgupta and Deb, 1991; Dutta and Laslier, 1999; de Donder, Le Breton and Truchon, 2000; Fodor and Roubens, 1994; Kitainik, 1993; Litvakov and Vol'skiy, 1986; Nurmi and Kacprzyk, 1991; Pattanaik and Sengupta, 2000; Roubens, 1989) . The related problem of ranking alternatives on the basis of the results of pairwise contests between these alternatives has comparatively received much less attention in recent years (see, however, Henriet, 1985; Rubinstein, 1980) , although it generated classical studies (see Kemeny, 1959; Kemeny and Snell, 1962; Slater, 1961) and is clearly in the spirit of Social Welfare Functionsà la Arrow (Arrow, 1963) . This is a pity since most classical applications of choice procedures are also potential applications for ranking procedures. This is, e.g., clearly the case for sports since most leagues want to rank order teams at the end of season and not only to select the winner(s). This also the case in the many situations in which, although a choice between alternatives is to be made, alternatives may disappear (e.g. candidates for a position may withdraw), so that there is a necessity of building a waiting list.
The problem of devising sound ranking procedures for such situations can be studied without explicit reference to choice procedures (see Bouyssou, 1992b; Bouyssou and Perny, 1992; Bouyssou and Pirlot, 1997; Bouyssou and Vincke, 1997; Henriet, 1985; Rubinstein, 1980; Vincke, 1992) . This is in line with the advice in Moulin (1986) to clearly distinguish the question of ranking alternatives from the one of selecting winners.
We shall be concerned in this paper with quite a different approach to ranking on the basis of pairwise contests that is intimately connected with choice procedures. Several authors have indeed suggested (see Arrow and Raynaud, 1986; Roy, 1991 ) that a ranking procedure could well be devised by successive applications of a choice procedure. The most natural way to do so goes as follows:
-Apply the choice procedure to the whole set of alternatives. Define the first equivalence class of the ranking as the chosen elements in the whole set. -Remove the chosen elements from the set of alternatives.
Hence we obtain the ranking (using obvious notation): d c e [a ∼ g] b f . This result is clearly different from the one that we would have obtained ranking alternatives using their Copeland scores in X, i.e.:
although both rankings clearly coincide on their first equivalence class.
Using ranking by choosing, we may associate a well-defined ranking procedure to every choice procedure. A natural question arises. If the choice procedure has "nice properties", will it also be the case for the induced ranking procedure? This is the subject of this paper.
Most ranking procedures that are used in practice are not of this ranking by choosing type. Most often (take the example of most sports leagues) they are rather based on some kind of scoring function that aggregates into a real number the results of the various pairwise contests, e.g. one may rank alternatives according to their Copeland scores.
Although ranking procedures induced by choice procedures may seem complex when compared to those based on scoring functions, several authors have forcefully argued in favor of their reasonableness (see Arrow and Raynaud, 1986; Roy, 1991) and many of them were proposed (see Arrow and Raynaud, 1986; Debord, 1987a; Matarazzo, 1990; Roy, 1978) . They are, in general, easy to compute and rather easy to explain. They are-structurally-insensitive to a possible withdrawal of (all) best ranked alternatives (see Vincke, 1992) . Furthermore, if the answer to the preceding question were to be positive, there would be a clear interest in using well-behaved choice procedures as a basis for ranking procedures.
The situation is however more complex. The potential drawbacks of these ranking by choosing procedures should be obvious: their very conception implies the existence of discontinuities together with a progressive impoverishment of information from one iteration to another. This is likely to create difficulties with most wanted normative properties like monotonicity as was forcefully shown by Perny (1992) . The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent of these difficulties concentrating on monotonicity. An example will clarify how bad the situation can be.
Example 1 (continued)
Consider the tournament V identical to T except that aV d. We now have Cop(X, V ) = {b, c, d}. We had a b with T . We now obtain b a with V , while the position of a has clearly improved when going from T to V . This is a serious monotonicity problem.
The problem studied in this paper is reminiscent of the well-know monotonicity problems encountered in electoral procedures with "run-offs", e.g. the French system of plurality with run-off, the Hare, Coombs and Nansson procedures (see Fishburn, 1977; Moulin, 1988 ) that also involve discontinuities. It is well-known that they often have a disappointing behavior with respect to monotonicity (see Fishburn, 1977 Fishburn, , 1982 Moulin, 1988; Saari, 1994; Smith, 1973) . Although these difficulties are linked with our problem, electoral procedures with run-offs are choice procedures and not ranking procedures. Hence the problem studied here has distinctive characteristics.
Although many ranking by choosing procedures have been suggested, their study has received limited attention so far. Perny (1992) showed that most procedures of this type proposed in the literature violate monotonicity. He suggested to study the problem more in depth. Shortly after, we proposed in Bouyssou (1995) some results in that direction (since more powerful results appear difficult to obtain, this text is a revised and simplified version of Bouyssou (1995) ). More recently, the problem was tackled in Durand (2001) and Juret (2001) in a Social Choice context.
We show here that, rather surprisingly, there are non-trivial and rather wellbehaved choice procedures leading to ranking by choosing procedures satisfying a weak form of monotonicity. The hope of finding really attractive ranking by choosing procedures is however shown to be limited.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our main definitions and elucidate our notation. Our results are collected in section 3. We apply our results to the classical case of tournaments in section 4. A final section discusses our findings.
The setting
Throughout the paper, X will denote a finite set with |X| = m ≥ 1 elements. Elements of X will be interpreted as alternatives that are to be compared on the basis the results of several kinds of pairwise contests. We denote by P(X) the set of all nonempty subsets of X.
Pairwise contests between alternatives
Pairwise contests between alternatives arise in many different contexts. Therefore, it is not surprising that many different models have been proposed to summarize them. The most simple ones consist of binary relations: tournaments (see Laslier, 1997; Moulin, 1986) , weak tournaments (see Peris and Subiza, 1999) , reflexive binary relations (see Vincke, 1992) . More sophisticated models use real-valued functions on X 2 : weighted tournaments (see de Donder et al., 2000) , comparison functions (see Dutta and Laslier, 1999) or general valued relations (see Kitainik, 1993; Fodor and Roubens, 1994; Roubens, 1989) . Many of these models can be justified by results saying that some type of aggregation methods lead to all (or nearly all) instances of these models (see Bouyssou, 1996; Deb, 1976; Debord, 1987b; McGarvey, 1953) .
Although our results can be extended to more general cases (see Bouyssou, 1995) , we use throughout the paper the comparison function model presented in Dutta and Laslier (1999) . It is sufficiently flexible to include: -all complete binary relations and, hence, to deal with all C1 social choice functions in the sense of Fishburn (1977) , i.e. all social choice functions based on the simple majority relation of some profile of linear orders and -all 0-weighted tournaments, as defined in de Donder et al. (2000) and, hence, to deal with most (in fact with what de Donder et al. (2000) called C1.5 social choice functions) C2 social choice functions in the sense of Fishburn (1977) , i.e. social choice functions that are based on a matrix giving for each ordered pair (x, y) of alternatives the number n(x, y) being the difference between the number of linear orders in the profile for which x is ahead of y minus the number of linear orders for which y is ahead of x.
These two examples are detailed below. We refer to Dutta and Laslier (1999) for more possible interpretations.
Example 2 (Weak Tournaments)
A weak tournament V on X is a complete (xV y or yV x, for all x ∈ X) binary relation 1 on X. A tournament is an antisymmetric (xV y and yV x ⇒ x = y, for all x, y ∈ X) weak tournament. We denote T(X) (resp. WT(X)) the set of all tournaments (resp. weak tournaments) on X. A transitive tournament (resp. weak tournament) is a linear order (resp. weak order). We note WO(X) the set of all weak orders on X.
The interest in weak tournaments is explained by McGarvey's theorem (see McGarvey, 1953) ensuring that any V ∈ WT(X) is the simple majority relation of some profile of linear orders.
Note that any comparison function π ∈ G(X) induces a weak tournament (1)
We sometimes abuse notations in the sequel writing V instead of π V when dealing with weak tournaments.
Example 3 (0-weighted tournaments)
A 0-weighted tournament (de Donder et al., 2000) on X is a complete digraph which set of vertices is X and in which each arc (x, y) has a skew symmetric integer valuation n(x, y). Using Debord's theorem (see Debord, 1987b) , any 0-weighted tournament with all n(x, y) having the same parity is the net preference matrix of some profile of linear orders on X, i.e. there is a profile of linear orders such that n(x, y) is the number of linear orders in the profile for which x > y minus the number of linear orders in the profile for which y > x. Clearly the set of comparison functions includes all 0-weighted tournaments.
Definition 1 (Improving the position of an alternative) Let π and π be two comparison functions on X. We say that π improves x ∈ X w.r.t. π if for all y, z ∈ X \ {x},
We often denote π x↑ a comparison function improving x ∈ X w.r.t. π. y, z) . It is clear that the covering relation thus defined is asymmetric and transitive. Hence its has maximal elements. We denote U C(A, π) ⊆ A the set of maximal elements of the covering relation in A.
This definition, due to Dutta and Laslier (1999) , extends to comparison functions a well-known concept due to Fishburn (1977) and Miller (1977 Miller ( , 1980 . We say that x sign-covers y in A for π if it covers y for the comparison function π sign defined by:
for all x, y ∈ X. It is clear that the sign covering relation is asymmetric and transitive and, therefore, has maximal elements. We denote SU C(A, π) ⊆ A the set of maximal elements of the sign covering relation in A. It is easy to see that SU C(A, π) ⊆ U C(A, π), while the two sets coincide for weak tournaments.
A Condorcet winner in A ∈ P(X) for a comparison function π ∈ G(X) is an alternative x that defeats all other alternatives in A in pairwise contests, i.e. such that π(x, y) > π(y, x), for all y ∈ A \ {x}. It is clear that the set of Condorcet Winners Cond (A, π) is either empty or is a singleton.
Remark 1
When there is a Condorcet winner, it is clear that Cond (X, π) = SU C(A, π) and, hence, Cond (X, π) ⊆ U C(A, π). The uncovered set U C(A, π) may however contain other alternatives.
Ranking procedures
A ranking procedure (for comparison functions on X) associates with each comparison function π on X a weak order (π) ∈ WO(X), i.e. is a function from G(X) into WO(X). The asymmetric (resp. symmetric) part of (π) is denoted (π) (resp. ∼(π)).
Example 4 (Ranking procedures induced by a scoring function)
Many ranking procedures are based on scoring functions on X. A simple 2 scoring function associates with each π ∈ G(X), each A ⊆ X and each x ∈ A a real number Score F (x, A, π) = F |A| (π(x, y) y∈A\{x} ), where F |A| is a real-valued function on R |A|−1 being symmetric in its arguments and nondecreasing in all its arguments. The ranking procedure F associated to Score F ranks alternatives in X according to their score Score F (x, X, π), i.e.,
for all x, y ∈ X and all π ∈ G(X). Two scoring functions that are often used are:
-the Copeland score in which F = and -the Kramer score in which F = min.
Note that using the Copeland score on a 0-weighted tournament corresponding to a net preference matrix of a profile of linear orders amounts to ranking alternatives according to their Borda score (see e.g. Young, 1974) . By definition, the function F |X| used to compute Score F (x, X, π) is independent of x and symmetric in its arguments. Therefore, such ranking procedures do not depend on a particular labeling of the alternatives. Furthermore, since F |X| have been supposed to be nondecreasing in all its arguments, the ranking will respond in the expected direction to an improvement of x in π. This is formalized below.
Let Σ(X) be the set of all one-to-one functions on X (i.e. permutations). Given a comparison function π and a permutation σ ∈ Σ(X), we define π σ as the comparison function defined letting, for all
Definition 2 (Neutral ranking procedures)
A ranking procedure on X is said to be neutral if, for all for all π ∈ G(X) and
Observe that with a neutral ranking procedure, if the comparison function is totally indecisive, i.e. if π(x, y) = π(y, x) = 0, for all x, y ∈ X, then this indecisivity is reflected in the weak order (π), i.e. x (π) y, for all x, y ∈ X.
Definition 3 (Monotonic ranking procedure)
A ranking procedure on X is said to be:
for all x, y ∈ X and all π, π ∈ G(X) such that π = π and π improves x w.r.
t. π (see definition 1).
Strict monotonicity requires that any improvement of the position of an alternative is sufficient to break ties in . This is a very strong condition, although it proves useful to characterize ranking procedures based on scoring functions F |X| that are increasing in all arguments (see Bouyssou, 1992b; Henriet, 1985; Rubinstein, 1980 ). Monotonicity implies weak monotonicity which in turn implies very weak monotonicity. As already observed, it is easy to build a monotonic ranking procedure using a scoring function. This will clearly be more difficult with ranking by choosing procedures in view of example 1. In a weakly monotonic ranking procedure, "efforts do not hurt", since the position of the improved alternative cannot deteriorate: it may only happen that beaten alternatives now tie with the improved one. Very weak monotonicity only forbids strict reversals in after an improvement. Although this is a very weak condition, example 1 shows that it can be violated with seemingly reasonable ranking by choosing procedures. Durand (2001) , in a classic social choice context, proves a negative result on the existence of strictly monotonic ranking by choosing procedure. His use of strict monotonicity tends to limit the scope of this result however.
Remark 2
Consider a weak order W ∈ WO(X) and its associated comparison function π W as defined by (1). Since W is a weak order, it seems obvious to require that any reasonable ranking procedure should not alter this ranking.
Definition 4 (Faithful ranking procedure)
A ranking procedure on X is said to be faithful if, for all weak orders W ∈ WO(X) and all x, y ∈ X, x (π W ) y ⇔ x W y. A ranking procedure is said to be faithful for linear orders if the above condition holds for antisymmetric weak orders, i.e. linear orders.
Many other conditions can obviously be defined for ranking procedures (for an overview, see Bouyssou and Vincke, 1997; Henriet, 1985; Rubinstein, 1980; Vincke, 1992 ). They will not be useful here. The analysis of ranking by choosing procedures clearly calls now for a closer look at choice procedures.
Choice procedures
A choice procedure (for comparison functions on X) S associates with each comparison function π ∈ G(X) and each nonempty subset A ∈ P(X) a nonempty set of chosen 3 alternatives included in A. More formally, a choice procedure S on X is a function from P(X) × G(X) into P(X) such that, for all A ∈ P(X) and all π ∈ G(X), S(A, π) ⊆ A. Given two choice procedures S and S, we say that S refines S if, for all A ∈ P(X) and all π ∈ G(X), S (A, π) ⊆ S(A, π).
Example 5 (Choice procedures induced by scoring functions)
Like with ranking procedures, many choice procedures are based on simple scoring functions (again, we do not envisage here scoring functions that depend on the entire comparison function π). Using the notation introduced in example 4, we simply have, for all A ∈ P(X) and all x ∈ A,
Such choice procedures are clearly independent of the labeling of alternative and have obvious monotonicity properties. Furthermore, the chosen elements in A only depends on the restriction π | A of π to A. We formalize these properties below.
Definition 5 (Properties of a choice procedure)
A choice procedure S on X is said to be:
We refer to de Donder et al. (2000), Dutta and Laslier (1999) , Henriet (1985) , Laslier (1997) , Moulin (1986) and Peris and Subiza (1999) for a thorough overview of the variety and the properties of neutral, local, Condorcet and monotonic choice procedures. An example of such procedures is SU C(A, π) (see Dutta and Laslier, 1999) as defined above.
Remark 3
Note that, with the question of ranking by choosing procedures in mind, only local choice procedures raise problems. Using a non local choice procedure, e.g. the one selecting in all A ∈ P(X) alternatives of maximal Copeland score in X, instead of A, it is easy to obtain a monotonic ranking by choosing procedure.
Choice procedures may be viewed as associating a choice function (see Moulin, 1985) on X to every comparison function π defined on X. Hence, when π is kept fixed, classical properties of choice functions may be transferred to choice procedures. We recall some of them below, referring the reader to Aizerman (1985) , Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995), Malishevski (1993) , Moulin (1985) and Sen (1977) for a detailed study of these conditions and their relations to the classical one guaranteeing that a choice functions can be rationalized, i.e. that there is a complete binary relation on X such that chosen elements in any subset are the greatest elements of this binary relation restricted to that subset.
Definition 6 (Choice functions properties of choice procedures)
A choice procedure S on X is said to satisfy:
for all π ∈ G(X) and all A, B ∈ P(X).
Remark 4
We follow here the terminology of Moulin (1985) that has gained wide acceptance. Let us however observe that the name Aizerman, is especially unfortunate since, in fact, M. A. Aizerman and his collaborators apparently never used this condition in their classical works on choice functions; on the contrary, they made central use of SSP under the name Outcast (see Aizerman and Malihevski, 1981; Aizerman, 1985; Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995) . We follow Sen (1977) for β + .
Let us observe that SSP clearly implies both Aizerman and Idempotency. The reverse implication is also true (see Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995; Dutta and Laslier, 1999; Moulin, 1985) . On the other hand, SSP and β + are independent conditions (see Aizerman, 1985; Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995; Malishevski, 1993; Sen, 1977) . Clearly, none of these conditions is sufficient to imply that the choice function can be rationalized (for such conditions, see Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995; Moulin, 1985; Sen, 1977) .
Remark 5 (Refining choices)
Let S be a choice procedure on X and define S 1 = S. For all integers k ≥ 2, we define S k and S ∞ letting, for all A ∈ P(X) and all π ∈ G(X),
It is clear that S k and S ∞ are choice procedures. They are obtained by successive refinements of S. It is well-known that when S is monotonic but not idempotent, it may happen that S ∞ is not monotonic. This the case with SU C (see Laslier, 1997) .
An apparently open question is to find necessary and sufficient conditions on S so that this is the case. This problem is clearly related to the already-mentioned monotonicity problems encountered in electoral procedures with runoffs. We do not study it here.
Ranking procedures induced by choice procedures
Ranking by choosing procedures build a weak order by successive applications of a choice procedure, its first equivalence class consisting of the elements chosen in X, the second equivalence class of the elements chosen after the elements chosen at the first step are removed from X and so on. We need some more notation in order to formalize this idea. Let W be a weak order on a set Y . We denote by Cl k (Y , W ) (where k is an integer ≥ 1) the elements in the k-th equivalence class of W , i.e. Cl 1 (Y , W ) = {x ∈ Y : xW y, ∀y ∈ Y } and, for all k ≥ 2,
Note that Cl 1 (Y , W ) is always nonempty and that a weak order is clearly uniquely defined by its ordered set of equivalence classes.
Similarly, we denote R k (X, S, π), the unchosen elements in X with π after k ∈ N applications of S, i.e.
with the understanding that S(∅, π) = ∅. Note that R 0 (X, S, π) is nonempty by construction.
Definition 7 (Ranking procedure induced by a choice procedure) Let S be a choice procedure on X. The ranking procedure S induced by S is the ranking procedure such that, for all π ∈ G(X) and all integers k ≥ 1,
Some properties of S are easily transferred to S .
Lemma 1 (Transferring properties from choice procedures to ranking procedures) -If S is neutral then S is neutral, -If S is Condorcet then S is faithful for linear orders, -If S is based on a scoring function with all functions F |A| being increasing in all arguments then S is faithful. -If S is a local, neutral, Aizerman and refines U C then S is faithful. Proof
The first three assertions are immediate from the definitions. Let us prove the last one. Suppose that W is a weak order. It is clear that U C(X, W ) = Cl 1 (X, W ).
Since S is local and neutral, we know that S(Cl 1 (X, W ), W ) = Cl 1 (X, W ). Hence, S(X, W ) = Cl 1 (X, W ). The conclusion follows from a repetition of this argument.
2
Unfortunately, as shown in example 1 above, monotonicity is not transferred as easily from choice procedures to ranking procedures. Since monotonicity seems to be a vital condition for the reasonableness of a ranking procedure, we investigate below which choice procedures S have an associated ranking procedure S that is monotonic or weakly monotonic.
Remark 6
It should be observed that given a scoring function Score F the ranking procedures F and S F may have quite different properties. Considering for instance the Kramer score Score min and its extension to choice procedures, it is easy to see that min is not faithful (since all alternatives not belonging to the first equivalence of a weak order are tied with min ). On the contrary, it is clear that that Smin is indeed faithful.
Results

Weak monotonicity
Our aim is to find conditions on choice procedures that would guarantee that the ranking procedures they induce are weakly monotonic. As already shown by example 1, there are choice procedures S that are neutral, local, (properly) monotonic and Condorcet while S is not even very weakly monotonic. Guaranteeing that S is weakly monotonic is therefore not as trivial a task as it might appear at first sight.
Our central result in this section says that any local and monotonic choice procedure satisfying SSP generates a ranking procedure that is weakly monotonic.
Proposition 1 (SSP and weak monotonicity) If S is local, monotonic and satisfies SSP then S is weakly monotonic. Proof
Suppose that S is local, monotonic and satisfies SSP and that S is not weakly monotonic. By definition this implies that for some π ∈ G(X), some x, y ∈ X and some π x↑ improving x ∈ X w.r.t. π, we have x S (π) y and y S (π x↑ ) x.
Since S is monotonic, it is impossible that x ∈ Cl 1 (X, S (π)) = S(X, π) since this would imply x ∈ Cl 1 (X, S (π x↑ )) = S(X, π x↑ ), which violates y S (π x↑ )x. By construction, we know that x / ∈ Cl 1 (X, S (π x↑ )) = S(X, π x↑ ).
Since x / ∈ S(X, π), we have S(X, π) ⊆ Z ⊆ X and SSP implies S(X, π) = S(Z, π). Similarly, we know that
, we have S(X, π x↑ ) = S(X, π) and, hence, Cl 1 (X, S (π)) = Cl 1 (X, S (π x↑ )). Note, in particular that y / ∈ Cl 1 (X, (π x↑ )).
It is now impossible that x ∈ Cl 2 (X, (π)). Indeed this would imply that x ∈ S(R 1 (X, S, π), π), so that, using the monotonicity of S, x ∈ S(R 1 (X, S, π), π x↑ ). Since R 1 (X, S, π) = R 1 (X, S, π x↑ ), this would imply x ∈ Cl 2 (X, (π x↑ )), which would contradict y S (π x↑ )x.
Because S is local, the above reasoning can now be applied to R 1 (X, S, π) = R 1 (X, S, π x↑ ). As above, this leads to Cl 2 (X, S (π)) = Cl 2 (X, S (π x↑ )) and y / ∈ Cl 2 (X, (π x↑ )).
Iterating the above reasoning easily leads to a contradiction. 2
Let us note that in the literature on tournaments it is possible to find rather wellbehaved choice procedures that are neutral, local, monotonic while satisfying SSP (e.g. M CS, BP , as defined below, see Laslier, 1997) . For general comparison functions, Dutta and Laslier (1999) also present several such procedures. Proposition 1, therefore shows that there are many well-behaved weakly monotonic ranking procedures induced by choice procedures. Let us give an example of such a procedure.
Example 6 (Sign Essential set)
The bipartisan set BP defined for tournaments (see Laffond, Laslier and LeBreton, 1993a) has recently been generalized to comparison functions (see Dutta and Laslier, 1999; de Donder et al., 2000) . Observe that any comparison function π induces a symmetric two-person zero-sum game (in which each of the two players have the set of strategies X and the payoff functions are given by π(x, y) and π (y, x) ). The same is clearly true for π sign . It is well-known that all such games have Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (see von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) . The Sign Essential Set (SES) consists in all pure strategies that are played with strictly positive probability in one of the Nash equilibria in the symmetric two-person zero-sum game induced by π sign . Dutta and Laslier (1999) show that SES defines a choice procedure that is monotonic, Condorcet and satisfies SSP , on top of being clearly local and neutral. It is not difficult to show that it refines U C (as well as several other reasonable choice procedures). Hence, using lemma 1 and proposition 1, we know that SES is a neutral, faithful and weakly monotonic ranking procedure. It therefore qualifies as a very reasonable ranking by choosing procedure.
Remark 7 (Aizerman cannot be substituted to SSP )
The above proposition does not hold if Aizerman is substituted to SSP . It is well-known that SU C is monotonic and satisfies Aizerman but violates SSP (see Laslier, 1997 ). The following example shows that SU C is not even very weakly monotonic. Let X = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g} . Consider the tournament T on X defined by:
Example 7 ( SU C is not very weakly monotonic)
aT b, aT d, aT e, aT f, aT g, bT c, bT d, bT e, bT f, bT g, cT a, cT e, cT f, cT g, dT c, dT e, eT f, f T d, f T g, gT d, gT e.
It is easy to check, using the comparison function defined by (1)
Consider now the tournament V identical to T except that eV b. We have: SU C(X, V ) = {a, b, c, d}, so that d SU C (V ) e. This shows that SU C is not very weakly monotonic.
Remark 8 (Monotonicity is not implied)
It is clearly tempting to look for a result similar to proposition 1 involving the monotonicity of S . This problem is far more difficult than with weak monotonicity and we only have negative results on that point. Proposition 2 below implies that proposition 1 is no longer true if monotonicity is substituted to weak monotonicity.
Remark 9 (SSP is not necessary)
For local and monotone choice procedures π, SSP is a sufficient condition for S to be weakly monotonic. It is not necessary however, even when attention is restricted to the, well-structured, case of tournaments. Let us consider this case and show that there are, on some sets X, choice procedures violating SSP while being weakly monotonic. We abuse notation in the sequel and write T instead of π T .
Suppose that |X| = 5. The following example shows that SU C may violate SSP . 
Example 8 (SU
We have SU C(X, T ) = {a, b, c, d} (e is covered by c) and SU C({a, b, c, d}, T ) = {a, b, c} (d is covered by a). This violates SSP since SU C(X, T ) ⊆ {a, b, c, d}
Let us now show that, when |X| ≤ 5, SU C is weakly monotonic. It clearly suffices to show that weak monotonicity holds when an alternative is improved w.r.t. a single other alternative. The proof uses the following well-known facts on uncovered elements in a tournament.
Lemma 2 (Miller (1977 (Miller ( , 1980 ; Moulin (1986)) 1. x ∈ SU C(A, T ) iff for all y ∈ A \ {x}, either xT y or [xT z and zT y], for some z ∈ A (2-step principle).
SU C(A, T ) = {x} iff xT y for all y ∈ A \ {x}.
If |SU C(A, T )| = 1 then |SU C(A, T )| ≥ 3 and we have Cond (SU C(A, T ),
T | SU C(A,T ) ) = ∅.
Lemma 3
If |X| ≤ 4, SU C is weakly monotonic.
Proof
If |X| ≤ 3, the proof easily follows from lemma 2 and the monotonicity of SU C. If |X| = 4, three cases arise by lemma 2.
Since a is a Condorcet winner in X, it is impossible to improve a. If any b = a is improved w.r.t. a, it becomes uncovered, using lemma 2, and weak monotonicity of SU C cannot possibly be violated. If b = a is improved w.r.t. an alternative different from a, then a remains the Condorcet winner and it is clear that weak monotonicity of SU C cannot possibly be violated.
2. If |Cl 1 (X, SU C (T ))| = 3 and therefore |Cl 2 (X, SU C (T ))| = 1. Weak monotonicity of SU C can only be violated if an element in Cl 1 (X, SU C (T )) = SU C(X, T ) is improved. Since SU C is monotonic, this improved element will remain uncovered in X. Thus, weak monotonicity cannot possibly be violated. 3. If |Cl 1 (X, SU C (T ))| = 4, weak monotonicity of SU C follows from the monotonicity of SU C. 2
Lemma 4
If |X| = 5, SU C is weakly monotonic.
Proof
Four cases arise by lemma 2.
Since a is a Condorcet winner in X, it is impossible to improve a. If an alternative not in Cl 1 (X, SU C (T )) is improved w.r.t. a, it becomes uncovered, because of part 1 of lemma 2. Thus weak monotonicity cannot be violated. If an alternative not in Cl 1 (X, SU C (T )) is improved w.r.t. another alternative not in Cl 1 (X, SU C (T )), it is clear that after the improvement a remains a Condorcet winner and, thus, chosen alone in X. In view of lemma 3, weak monotonicity cannot possibly be violated. 2. If |Cl 1 (X, SU C (T ))| = 3 and, therefore, |Cl 2 (X, SU C (T ))| = 1 and
and Cl 3 (X, SU C (T )) = {e}. We know from lemma 2 that there is a circuit linking a, b and c and that dT e. We suppose w.l.o.g. that the circuit is aT b, bT c, cT a. It is impossible to improve e and to violate weak monotonicity. In view of part 1 of lemma 2, observe that d can beat at most one alternative in {a, b, c} because we know that d / ∈ SU C(X, T ). If d beats exactly one alternative in {a, b, c} any improvement of d will make it uncovered. Hence, weak monotonicity cannot be violated. Suppose therefore that d does not beat any alternative in {a, b, c}. Because e / ∈ SU C(X, T ), e can beat at most one alternative in {a, b, c}. Suppose first that e does not beat any alternative in {a, b, c}. In any T improving d, it is not difficult to check that SU C (T ) = SU C (T ) and no violation of weak monotonicity can occur. Suppose then that e beats one alternative in {a, b, c} and suppose w.l.o.g. that eT a. If T improves d w.r.t. a, we still have SU C (T ) = SU C (T ). If T improves d w.r.t. b then SU C(X, T ) = {a, b, c, d} so that no violation of weak monotonicity can occur. If T improves d w.r.t. c then SU C(X, T ) = {a, b, c} so that no violation of weak monotonicity can occur. 3. If |Cl 1 (X, SU C (T ))| = 4. We have |Cl 2 (X, SU C (T ))| = 1. Weak monotonicity of SU C can only violated if an element in Cl 1 (X, SU C (T )) = SU C(X, T ) is improved. Since SU C is monotonic, this improved element will remain uncovered in X. Thus, weak monotonicity cannot possibly be violated.
4. If |Cl 1 (X, SU C (T ))| = 5, weak monotonicity of SU C follows from the monotonicity of SU C. 2
Remark 10
As conjectured by Perny (1995) , it is possible to show that if S is monotonic and satisfies β + then S is weakly monotonic. This offers alternative sufficient conditions on S guaranteeing the weak monotonicity of S (since there are local, monotonic choice procedures satisfying SSP but violating β + , e.g. SES, it is clear that β + is not a necessary condition for weak monotonicity). It should nevertheless be observed that:
-the result does not make use of the locality of S, whereas the question of the monotonicity of ranking by choosing procedures is only of particular interest if S is local, -it is well-known (see Moulin, 1986; Sen, 1977) that β + is a very strong condition. For instance, in the case of tournaments, any choice procedure S satisfying β + and Condorcet must include the top cycle T C, i.e. the choice procedure selecting in A the maximal elements of the asymmetric part of the transitive closure on A of T . Clearly, such choice procedures are highly undiscriminating.
Therefore, although β + and SSP are independent conditions, we do not pursue this point here and leave to the interested reader the, easy, proof of the above claim (see http://www.lamsade.dauphine.fr/˜bouyssou/).
Remark 11
It is not difficult to observe that the proof of proposition 1 makes no use of the skew-symmetry property of comparison functions (when weak monotonicity is properly redefined). It can therefore be easily extended to cover more general cases (see Bouyssou, 1995) , e.g. general valued (or fuzzy) binary relations (see Barrett et al., 1990; Bouyssou, 1992a; Bouyssou and Pirlot, 1997) . We do not explore this point here.
Monotonicity
Let us consider the case of tournaments (see Laslier, 1997; Moulin, 1986) . There are neutral, monotonic and Condorcet choice procedures S such that S is monotonic. This is clearly the case for T C which satisfies both SSP and β + . We already observed that T C is a very undiscriminating choice procedure for tournaments. It would therefore be of interest to find more discriminating choice procedures S so that S is monotonic. As show below, this proves difficult however.
Proposition 2 (Covering compatibility and Aizerman)
Let S be a local, neutral and monotonic choice procedure satisfying Aizerman. If S refines U C then S is not monotonic. Proof A necessary condition for S to be monotonic is that S is properly monotonic. Indeed, suppose that that, for some X, some π ∈ G(X), some x, y ∈ X with x = y, we have y / ∈ S(A, π) and y ∈ S(A, π x↑ ), where π x↑ improves x w.r.t. π. This would imply x S (π) y and x ∼ S (π x↑ ) y, violating monotonicity. Thus, the claim will be proved if we can show that, for all neutral and monotonic choice procedures refining U C and satisfying Aizerman, there is a comparison function π such that a ∈ S(X, π) b / ∈ S(X, π) and b ∈ S(X, π a↑ ), i.e. that S is not properly monotonic. The following example suffices. We have U C(X, T ) = {a, c, d} and aT d, dT c and cT a. Therefore, since S re-
Because S is local and neutral, we know that S({a, c, d}, T ) = {a, c, d}.
Hence we must have S(X, T ) = {a, c, d}.
Consider now the tournament V identical to T except that aV c. Using the same reasoning as above, it is easy to check that S(X, V ) = U C(X, V ) = {a, b, d}. Hence b enter the choice set while a is improved and S is not properly monotonic. Perny (1998 Perny ( , 2000 has proposed a different negative result using a "positive discrimination" condition on choice procedures that, in our framework, says that, starting with any comparison function, it is always possible to obtain any alternative as the unique choice provided this alternative is "sufficiently" improved. This negative result only deals with weak monotonicity of S however.
2
Remark 12
Remark 13
In a classic social choice context, Juret (2001, theorem 1) shows that monotonic and rationalizable choice procedures induce monotonic ranking by choosing procedures. This positive result seem to contrast with proposition 2. Let us however observe that, when |X| ≥ 3, it easily follows from Moulin (1986) that there is no local and Condorcet choice procedure satisfying Chernoff , i.e., for all π ∈ G(X) and all A, B ∈ P(X), , π) . Indeed suppose that {x, y, z} ⊆ X and consider any π ∈ G(X) such that π(x, y) = 1, π(y, z) = 1 and π(z, x) = 1. If S is local and Condorcet then we must have S({x, y}, π) = {x}, S({y, z}, π) = {y} and S({z, x}, π) = {z}. Using Chernoff implies that S({x, y, z}, π) = ∅, a contradiction.
Since Chernoff is a necessary condition for S to be rationalized and given the correspondence noted above between our setting and C1 and C2 social choice functions, in the sense of Fishburn (1977) , this limits the scope of the result in Juret (2001) either to C1 and C2 choice procedures that violate locality or Condorcet or to C3 choice procedures, i.e. procedures that are neither C1 (not based on the simple majority relation) nor C2 (not based on the 0-weighted tournament based on the profile).
Proposition 2 is fairly negative as long as Aizerman and the refinement of U C are considered important properties. When this is not the case, it is possible to envisage several choice procedures inducing a monotonic ranking by choosing procedure. As an example, consider the well known T C * choice procedure (see Schwartz, 1986) for weak tournaments selecting in any subset, the maximal elements of the asymmetric part of the transitive closure (on that subset) of the asymmetric part of the weak tournament. Simple examples show that T C * violates Aizerman and does not refine U C. Vincke (1992) proves that T C * is monotonic (see also Juret, 2001 ). It should however be noticed that T C * is a very particular ranking by choosing procedure since the transitive closure operation has a clearly global character, in spite of the progressive restriction on the set of alternatives. This type of ranking by choosing procedures are studied in Juret (2001) .
Application: the case of tournaments
In this section we apply the above results and observations to the case of tournaments, i.e. we only consider choice procedures defined for comparisons functions derived from tournaments. This case is of particular interest because such choice procedures have been analyzed in depth and, in spite of the restrictiveness of the antisymmetry hypothesis, the underlying choice problem is encountered in many different and important settings.
Laslier (1997) studies in detail seven 4 different choice procedures.We briefly present them below referring the reader to Laslier (1997) , Laffond, Laslier and LeBreton (1995) and Moulin (1986) for precise definitions and results:
Top Cycle T C selecting in A the element of the first equivalence class of the weak order being the transitive closure of T on A, Copeland Cop selecting in A the alternatives with the highest Copeland score in the tournament restricted to A, Slater SL selecting in A all alternatives having the first rank in a linear order on A at minimal distance of the restriction of T on A, Uncovered Set U C selecting all the uncovered alternatives in A (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1977) , Banks B selecting all alternatives in A starting a maximal transitive path of T on A (Banks, 1985) , Minimal Covering Set M CS selecting all alternatives in the unique covering set included in A of minimal cardinality (Dutta, 1988) , Bipartisan Set BP selecting in A all alternatives in the support of the unique Nash equilibrium of the symmetric two-person zero-sum game on A induced by T (Laffond et al., 1993a results from proposition 1, since it is well-known that both procedures are neutral, local, monotonic and satisfy SSP . The fact that they are not monotonic follows from proposition 2 since they both refine U C.
Part 3. We respectively showed in examples 1 and 7 that Cop and U C are not very weakly monotonic. It is easy to see that example 7 also shows that B is not very weakly monotonic; we have U C = B for both tournaments used in this example. It remains to show that SL is not very weakly monotonic. We skip the quite cumbersome details of the computation of Slater's orders below. Details can be found at http://www.lamsade.dauphine.fr/˜bouyssou. We do not know whether this example is minimal. Let X = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i} Consider now the tournament V identical to T except that iV a. Again skipping details, linear orders at minimal distance of V are at distance d = 10. There are exactly 11 such orders. We have SL(X, V ) = {b, g, h}. Similarly, we obtain SL(X \ {b, g, h}, V ) = {c}. Therefore c SL (V ) i. This shows that SL is not very weakly monotonic. 2
Example 10 ( SL is not very weakly monotonic)
Discussion
Using a ranking by choosing procedure raises serious monotonicity problems.
Rather surprisingly, as shown by proposition 1, it is possible to isolate a class of well-behaved choice procedures that lead to weakly monotonic ranking by choosing procedures. If weak monotonicity is considered as an attractive property, these ranking procedures may well be good candidates to compete with other ranking procedures. If monotonicity is considered of vital importance, then the situation is more critical since, as shown in proposition 2, there are no local, neutral, monotonic and Aizerman choice procedure that is reasonably discriminatory being included in U C and inducing a monotonic ranking procedure. This suggests several directions for future research. It would clearly be interesting to look for necessary and sufficient conditions on S for S to be (weakly) monotonic. In view of remark 9, this task is likely to be complex since the repeated use of S in order to build S only uses the result of the application of S on a relatively small number of subsets. Another intriguing problem would be to look for connections between the problem studied here and the one of finding necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing that S ∞ is monotonic. More research in this direction is clearly needed.
The difficulties encountered with ranking procedures induced by choice procedures may also be considered as an incentive to study ranking procedures for their own sake, i.e. independently of any choice procedure. Research in that direction has already started (see Bouyssou, 1992b; Bouyssou and Perny, 1992; Bouyssou and Pirlot, 1997; Bouyssou and Vincke, 1997; Henriet, 1985; Fodor and Roubens, 1994; Gutin and Yeo, 1996; Kano and Sakamoto, 1983; Rubinstein, 1980; Vincke, 1992) mainly considering ranking procedures based on scoring functions. This is at variance with the advice in Moulin (1986) to focus research on ranking procedure based on the approximation of a tournament (or a comparison function) by linear orders (or weak orders). This idea dates back at least to Barbut (1959) , Kemeny (1959) , Kemeny and Snell (1962) and Slater (1961) . Although it raises fascinating deep combinatorial questions and difficult algorithmic problems (see Barthélémy, Guénoche and Hudry, 1989; Monjardet, 1981, 1988; Bermond, 1972; Charon-Fournier, Germa and Hudry, 1992; Charon, Hudry and Woirgard, 1996; Hudry, 1989; Monjardet, 1990) , this line of research raises other difficulties. As argued in Perny (1992) and Roy and Bouyssou (1993) , -the choice of the distance function should be analyzed with care as soon as one leaves the, easy, case of a distance between tournament and linear orders (see, e.g. Roy and Słowiński, 1993) , -the likely occurrence of multiple optimal solutions to the optimization problem underlying the approximation is not easily dealt with,
-the normative properties of such procedures are not easy to analyze (see, however, Young and Levenglick, 1978) .
Hence, studying simpler procedures, e.g. the ones based on scoring functions maybe a good starting point. In many common situations, ranking and not choosing is the central question and there is a real need for a thorough study of ranking procedures.
